英语与东盟区域认同

English and regional identity in ASEAN

英语与东盟区域认同

Huan Yik Lee, M. Obaidul Hamid & Ian Hardy

作者简介

Huan Yik Lee，澳大利亚昆士兰大学教育学院博士研究生，同济大学语言规划与全球治理研究中心兼职研究员。主要研究方向为语言政策与规划、语言教育政策、语言意识形态、语言政治、语言社会学和多语。

M. Obaidul Hamid是澳大利亚昆士兰大学教育学院高级讲师。他发表了大量有关TESOL教育政策与实践，英语作为亚洲教学媒介语(EMI)，以及英语在个体流动和社会发展中的作用的论文。

Ian Hardy 是澳大利亚昆士兰大学教育学院副教授。他在教育政策与政治领域发表了大量文章，也逐渐关注和参与与国际教育和比较教育有关的政策研究。

ABSTRACT

The Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) has deployed English not only as its sole working language but also as a tool for forging regional identity, unity and solidarity among its ten member-states. Drawing on the concept of ‘imagined communities’ and, by extension, ‘imagined identity regionalism’, this article provides a critical examination of this policy desire and asks the question whether the desire should be read as a form of political rhetoric or an achievable goal for ASEAN. We argue that the unifying potential of English language as an imagined regional community and identity has yet to be realised. At best, English can be seen as contributing to ASEAN’s ‘functional identity’, rather than a more substantive ‘socio-cultural identity’. It is suggested that although the birth of a distinct hybridised variety of ASEAN English may facilitate a bottom-up linguistic identity imagination for ASEAN, such an ideal appears utopian at this time.

摘要

东南亚国家联盟（简称东盟）不仅将英语作为其唯一的工作语言，而且将英语作为在十个成员国之间建立区域认同、统一和团结的工具。本文利用“想象的共同体”概念，以及由其延伸出的“想象的认同区域主义”，对这种政策愿望进行了批判性审视，并就这种愿望应该被解读为一种政治修辞形式，还是东盟可以实现的目标展开探讨。研究认为，英语构建一个想象的区域共同体及认同的统一潜力尚未实现。目前，英语最多可以被视为有助于构建东盟的“功能认同”，而不是一个更实质性的“社会文化认同”。研究表明，尽管一种独特的东盟英语变体的产生可能有助于东盟自下而上的语言认同想象，但这种理想在现在看来似乎是一种“乌托邦”。

01

INTRODUCTION

The ASEAN Charter, while envisioning an ASEAN (Association of Southeast Asian Nations) with ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community’, mandates us to promote our common ASEAN Identity and a sense of belonging among its peoples in order to achieve its shared destiny, goals and values. With the diversity in ASEAN reflected in our diverse histories, races, cultures and belief systems, English is an important and indispensable tool to bring our Community closer together . . . Through English, we are raising our awareness of the ASEAN region and, with the many characteristics we share and hold dear, further strengthening our sense of an ASEAN Community.

(ASEAN Secretariat, 2013, p. 2).

English as a global language has presented a dilemma for national policymakers in Asian countries. While they cannot deny its instrumental potential as a global lingua franca to survive in a competitive world, they also cannot overlook its potential threat to national language, identity and culture (see Tsui & Tollefson, 2007). While this is the overarching situation of English across Asia, ASEAN, the regional association of ten Southeast Asian member-states – Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos,Malaysia,Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam – seems to project a radically different view of English. As the official statement cited above makes it clear, the Association seems to have deployed English not only as the sole working language but also as a tool for forging regional identity, unity and solidarity among the ten nations. Technically endorsing a controversial nationalist language ideology, this policy position seeks to articulate typical nationalist goals – identity and sense of belonging, to be achieved at the ‘supra-macro’ level, in this context, at the level of the regional association. This article provides a critical examination of this policy desire and asks the question whether the desire should be read as a form of political rhetoric or an achievable goal for ASEAN.

Over the years, ASEAN leaders have sought to re-define the region through the creation of an ASEAN Community, with the aim of building the existing loose ‘association of regional countries’ into a much closer ‘ASEAN community of nations’ (Moorthy & Benny, 2013). The ASEAN member nations, however, consist of multilingual, multicultural and socially diverse communities. Mahbubani and Sng (2017) posit that Southeast Asia has been intimately associated with four of the great universalist cultures and civilisations of the world including Chinese, Indian, Islamic and the Western. At the same time, forces of nationalism and ethnicity and socio-economic development pressures hinder greater regional integration (Pempel, 2005). These sociolinguistic, socio-historical and socio-political dynamics make creating and nurturing an ASEAN identity challenging (Narine, 2009). It may sound ironic that in a multilingual and multicultural Southeast Asia, English has emerged as one of the few plausible means that is expected to contribute towards the formation of a common regional identity. When ASEAN was formed in 1967, it was mainly seen to be a bulwark against the spread of communism (Severino, 2006) and this was what united the five founding nations – Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and Singapore. The strong anti-communism stance might have been a key motivation for using English as a de facto working language since its establishment. However, considering the controversy surrounding language and its indexicality with identity (Liu & Ricks, 2012), ASEAN’s agenda to have English as ‘the’ lingua franca potentially aims to explore the prospect of English, an ‘external’ language, as a symbolic identity marker for ASEAN. Drawing on the concept of ‘imagined communities’ and, by extension ‘imagined identity regionalism’, we argue that ASEAN’s motto of ‘One Vision, One Community, One Identity’, which is premised on English being the link language that gels the region and its people together, may be political rhetoric, although its propensity towards achieving such goals in the future cannot be discounted. We would like to note here that the regional linguistic and cultural diversity may well and truly be an important symbolic identity marker of ASEAN (when reimagining ASEAN identity regionalism), but in the interests of this paper, we attempt to critically examine a hitherto underexplored/novel idea regarding the role of English and its possibility/potential as part of ASEAN imagined common regional identity as a genesis to stimulate further discussion among scholars in the field.

02

ASEAN’S ‘ONE VISION, ONE IDENTITY,

 ONE COMMUNITY’

The formation and expansion of ASEAN is primarily a collective act of imagination undertaken by the region’s political elites (Acharya, 2000, 2009). ASEAN’s shared vision, as envisaged by the elites, is to intensify community building through enhanced regional cooperation and integration, and to establish an ASEAN Community, with three component pillars focusing on political security, economic opportunity and socio-cultural cohesion (Quayle, 2013). According to Chesterman (2008), ASEAN has seen the gradual emergence of an identity, justified in large part as a means of linking economies but incidentally establishing regular lines of communication for political, economic and socio-cultural reasons. To date, most studies about ASEAN’s regional identity and shared norms have been related to political science, international relations, security and economic questions (Hashim et al., 2016). One frequently highlighted feature among ASEAN member-states is ‘The ASEANWay’, a set of shared norms and principles in decision-making and negotiations, based on consensus, compromise and consultation (Acharya, 1997). However, ASEAN leaders recognise that geographical proximity and the ‘ASEAN Way’ are insufficient to drive the level of regional integration required in the new era (Acharya, 2017). Nurturing an ASEAN identity is an arduous task (Heng, 2015), as Southeast Asia lacks a common cultural or ideational heritage (Kumar & Siddique, 2008). If there is indeed a shared identity that reflects the region, it is perhaps a feeling of shared destiny as ASEAN nations develop themselves economically and socially (Acharya, 2017); in other words, countries share a kind of common aspiration of achieving modernity. Even, as Acharya (2017) argues, the need to create a sense of common or collective identity to build a true community legitimises cooperation nationally and internationally, and reinforces the rationale for collective action, what exactly constitutes ASEAN’s ‘common regional identity’ remains vague (Jones, 2004). ‘ASEAN identity’ is at best a recently framed identity – and a relatively weak one – among the many other identities that shape the policies and actions of the ASEAN member-states (Narine, 2009). The institutional imagination of ASEAN’s identity is fluid (Acharya, 2017) and there has yet to be a concrete framework of reference that ‘captures’ the characteristics of ASEAN’s identity formation. However, the ambiguity about the direction of regional-identity development makes us ‘try to build different kinds of identities hoping’ that this effort – in the context of this paper – to explore the prospects of English language as part of ASEAN’s imagined common identity, ‘will direct the further development in a good direction’ (Mutanen, 2010, p. 35).

Although ASEAN leaders have envisioned ‘One Community, One Identity’ at the organisational level, what matters more is a bottom-up awareness in the quest for a common ‘imagined’ identity among the citizens (Narine, 2009) within a sprawling region with an estimated population of 690 million. Severino (2006) opines that the core of the ASEAN Community should be the ASEAN Socio-Cultural Community (ASCC), if one conceives of the Socio-Cultural Community as a vehicle for developing a sense of Southeast Asian identity, and involving building regional awareness and fostering mutual understanding among the people. Of the three pillars of the ASEAN Community, the ASCC however, has often been labelled as lagging behind both the ASEAN Economic Community (AEC) and ASEAN Political-Security Community (APSC) (Kumar & Siddique, 2008; Narine, 2009). The APSC meanwhile lags behind AEC. To further illustrate the complexity in developing a regional identity, the member-states are ruled by different regimes including military dictatorships, Sultanates, Communist Party Rule and democracies. One wonders whether the promotion of an ASEAN political-security community is possible in such diversity of political governance. In the interest of this paper, promoting a sense of regional identity among the ordinary people of ASEAN should have been a fundamentally important issue for the Association. However, this is an agenda that has not received the resources or investment that it merits (Narine, 2009). This is primarily due to ASCC being given the least time and attention among the political elites, as they tend to channel their resources into resolving economic and political-security issues in particular. There is also a concerted urgency to expedite further integration in economic, and to a lesser extent, security sectors within the diplomatic circles in the region, leaving education and cultural integration efforts through ASCC as peripheral missions. As Severino (2006, pp. 368-369) aptly puts it, ‘(t)he Socio-Cultural Community was ostensibly brought in almost as an afterthought, at the Philippines’ suggestion, in the interest of rounding out the concept of a community.’ Considering the limitations involved, Narine (1999, 2009) opined that creating an ASEAN Community is, at best, a long-term project and, unsurprisingly, one that faces many practical issues. For ASEAN to become a full-fledged community and represent a new form of identity, it has to look beyond geopolitical and economic dimensions and widen its scope to include social and cultural dimensions (Heng, 2015), both of which have unfortunately been given less attention over the years (Jones, 2004).

To date, few studies have explored the nexus between language (English) and ASEAN’s identity formation from the ideology of ‘imagined regionalism’. Research on English as a lingua franca (Kirkpatrick, 2010, 2014) may possibly contribute to the study of identity regionalism, as it potentially examines shared norms that shape regional identity. The present article contributes to the dearth of research on the socio-cultural pillar of ASEAN and to what has been termed ‘imagined’ identity regionalism (Acharya, 2009; Hashim et al., 2016).When identity construction and imagined regionalism are considered, the place of English seems to be an important avenue for further examination.

2.1 Imagined communities, imagined regionalism and the concept of ‘oneness’

Anderson (1983, p. 6) defined a nation as ‘an imagined political community’, as ‘the members of even the smallest nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or even hear of them, yet in the minds of each lives the image of their communion’. In this context, imagined does not mean to be ‘false’ or ‘fictional’, but rather is used synonymously with perceived, à la Said’s (1979) ‘imagined geographies’. Imagined geographies implies a space created through certain imagery, texts, and/or discourses. Anderson (1991) argued that the creation of imagined communities became possible because of print capitalism. As he explained, the first European nation-states were formed around their ‘national print-languages’, with the emergence of the national language that, with shifting success, has been consolidated by economic and political institutions. Thus, the concept of ‘one nation, one language’ ideology has been much stronger for uniting communities with linguistic differences in Europe (Weber & Horner, 2012). Notably, many of these features are constantly invoked in the context of English for ASEAN.

Heng (2015) brings our attention to the commonalities between ASEAN’s ‘regional community-building’ and ‘nation-building’, adding that ASEAN was established using concepts related to ‘state-formation and nation-building’. The formation of an identity regionalism in Southeast Asia is connected with building imagined communities based on unity of the people (Acharya, 2017). Acharya (1997) used imagined communities to explain regionalism in ASEAN, involving a social construction of generative and self-reinforcing attitudes and behaviours that may gradually lead to the definition and realisation of a common identity. For instance, ASEAN is trying to create an awareness of a regional identity by introducing the notion of ASEAN into the primary education curriculum (Heng, 2015). With reference to Anderson’s print capitalism (1991), commercial printing made it possible to spread the idea of the nation and the ideology of imagined communities. Despite often being constructed at a national-level, its use can be extended to a level beyond nations – an ‘imagined regionalism’ – in the form of ASEAN’s identity and an ASEAN community with a shared vision, ostensibly through a shared language as a central theme in identity formation, as argued by Said and Anderson.

ASEAN’s imagined regionalism is chiefly premised on connecting the nations based upon their geographical contiguity in Southeast Asia. It is mainly linked to the concept of Oneness – ‘One Southeast Asia’ (Quayle, 2013), expanded from five founding members (Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, and the Philippines) in 1967 to ten nations, the latest being the admission of Cambodia in 1999. However, ASEAN, by no means, equals Southeast Asia as a geographical concept – for example, East Timor has not been allowed to become a member (Jönsson, 2010). In today’s complex world, the term oneness has started to be seen as a worldview for the twenty-first century. Atkinson (2011) stated that the eventual collective consciousness will lead to a unity of cultures, societies, and nations by embracing ‘unity in diversity’ (see also Heng, 2015). Jönsson (2010) claims that ‘unity-in-diversity’ avoids the (potential) clash between the creation of coherent political, cultural and social entities (unity) and ‘differing internal identity constellations (diversity)’, and can therefore be used in the process of regional identity-building. The concept of ‘oneness’ is embedded in the ASEAN motto – One Vision, One Community, One Identity. In this sense, there is an economic reason for integration (ASEAN Economic Community), followed by political integration (ASEAN Political-Security Community). Language as a sociocultural tool for regional integration thus completes the Șoneness’ concept.

Since the ASEAN identity is ‘imagined’ and constantly evolving (Acharya, 2017), if one pursues the nation-state linguistic ideology as a vantage point, then the logic of English language as a crucial element in ASEAN’s identity narrative can be contemplated. The fact that English is ‘the’ working language of ASEAN strengthens the case of English being packaged as an essential identity symbol of ASEAN. A reasonable inference could be that the ‘One Nation, One Language’ ideology (Fishman, 1968) has been appropriated to a ‘supra-macro’ level of ‘One ASEAN, One Language (English)’. The use of a single working language can perhaps be framed as encapsulating the ‘Oneness’ concept, as shown in the opening vignette, in promoting ASEAN ‘One Community, One Identity’. The English language, purportedly aimed at taming the Babel of languages at the regional level, might have contributed to a new form of ‘being’ or existence. This form of identity regionalism has not been officially stated; however, the opening vignette clearly articulates ASEAN’s intentions to use English language as a tool for further integration of the people and the nations. Critics however argue that such a proposition is often at odds with nationalism which predictably is more appropriate for nation-state level linguistic identity (Tupas, 2018).

Nonetheless, Acharya (2000) claims that the growth of a long-term and relatively robust form of regionalism(ASEAN) has created some kind of a sense of regional identity alongside the still distinctive national identities of Southeast Asian countries. Apart from the afore-mentioned the ASEAN Way, the only other tangible initiative towards a regional ASEAN identity to date has been the signing of the ASEAN Framework Agreement on Visa Exemption to facilitate intra-ASEAN, visa-free travel for a limited period of time among citizens from respective member-states. Past studies (Jönsson, 2010; Lo Bianco, 2004) have shown that identities can be overlapping, and individuals may have multiple identities. Can ASEAN member-states look beyond the nation-state lens and ‘add’ another layer of identity as part of a united regional community?

The section that follows elucidates the role of English language as an additional, functional lingua franca in the region mainly for pragmatic and instrumental purposes. Drawing on imagined communities, construction of identity is generally closely intertwined with linguistic nationalism in the Southeast Asian nations. The Singaporean and Indonesian contexts are used to illustrate language as a symbolic identity marker. The section after that analyses ASEAN’s documents, namely ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Workplan on Education and the ASEAN Sociocultural Community document, in relation to whether language (English) is part of the identity regionalism framework of ASEAN. The last section proposes ways forward, in terms of the prospect of English language as part of the ‘imagined regionalism’ narrative, and lays out future considerations towards achieving a shared regional identity

03

ENGLISH AS A LINGUA FRANCA IN 

SOUTHEAST ASIA

English in Southeast Asia broadly falls under two categories of Kachru’s theory of Concentric Circles, namely Outer Circle and Expanding Circle Englishes. The Outer Circle English is spoken in former colonies or protectorates of Great Britain (Brunei, Malaysia and Singapore) and the USA, (the Philippines). These countries have a much longer history of English language exposure than their counterparts in the Expanding Circle. Expanding Circle varieties include those spoken in countries such as Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam (Low & Ran, 2018). Myanmar is a grey area since the country had undergone several decades of British occupation in the 19th century (Kirkpatrick, 2010). Arguably, the English language development in the Expanding Circle ASEAN nations is occurring at a very rapid rate. English generally does not have a strong imperialistic connotation in these parts of Southeast Asia. Classified as the Expanding Circle contexts, Cambodia, Laos and Vietnam witnessed a vital shift from French to English(Kirkpatrick, 2020) due to socio-economic and political factors. In Indonesia, the transition from Dutch to English was rather seamless (Lowenberg, 1991). Also, a member of the Expanding Circle, Thailand prides itself as the only kingdom that was ‘free’ from foreign interference in this region. The English language tends to have a weaker influence on Thailand’s socio-political construction (Kirkpatrick, 2020). Kirkpatrick (2020) notes that the catalyst role for English as a language of education in Thailand and Indonesia, both examples of Expanding Circle countries, has happened due to their membership of ASEAN, and particularly since the ASEAN Charter 2009 officially made English its sole working language. These recent trends suggest that the postcolonial narrative with regards to English in ASEAN is almost non-existent (Kirkpatrick, 2010).

Even though English is not a native language of any of the ASEAN member countries, in the last two decades, each ASEAN member-government has implemented language education policies to accommodate English within their sociolinguistic ecology (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2019). The rationale for the inclusion of English in the linguistic ecology of most Southeast Asian nations is strikingly similar. English is normally constructed as an additional language that co-exists with national languages, minority languages and other local languages (Tupas, 2018). The strategic location of ASEAN within the Asia-Pacific region is another factor to be considered. English is usually the lingua franca or the essential ‘link’ language used to communicate with ASEAN’s external partners, including China, India, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, United States, United Kingdom, the European Union, Pakistan, Japan and South Korea.

Low and Ran (2018) posit that the major role of English in ASEAN is to serve as a practical lingua franca and therefore the majority of the ASEAN people are learning English to achieve functional proficiency. For ASEAN and the respective member-states, discourses of English as a ‘basic necessity’ and English for ‘wider opportunities’ have gained traction. Sercombe and Tupas (2014) observed that the trend of developing English language proficiency among citizens looks set to continue. In 2012, a $US25 million Brunei–US English Language Enrichment Project was implemented. This initiative was shared jointly by Universiti Brunei Darussalam and the East-West Centre, in Honolulu, Hawaii (Sercombe & Tupas, 2014). The overall aim was to further efforts to unify ASEAN members linguistically, as well as to boost opportunities for diplomacy, education and teaching in the region (Hodal, 2012).

3.1 Linguistic nationalism in ASEAN member-states

All ten ASEAN countries have chosen an ethnic language as a national language (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2020). However, an analysis of the official languages in these nations provides a more nuanced perspective. English has an official status in Singapore (co-existing with Malay, Mandarin and Tamil), Philippines (co-existing with Tagalog) and in the Borneo state of Sarawak in Malaysia. When further attempts towards enhancing the official status of English are made, it is at times deemed politically sensitive. Crystal (1997) argues that presenting English as a ‘global’ language is bound to be perceived as a political statement, as there is no more intimate or sensitive index of identity than language; the subject is easily politicised, as it has been in various localities. Lately, there have been concerns about English being a threat to national identity and national unity. In Malaysia, Indonesia and the Philippines, ambivalent attitudes towards English have been noted (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2019). Recent suggestions to make English the second language in Thailand (Person, 2010) and Vietnam (Tuan, 2019) have not been well-received by education stakeholders and national linguists. The proposal to have English as a medium of instruction in higher education in Myanmar has also faced some opposition and local resistance (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2019). These initiatives have prompted national governments to either push back or shelve their language planning decisions. Often, the tough balancing act between managing national language, English and other local languages results in policy flip-flops and heated debates. The overarching view in Southeast Asian polities is that at the national level, the association of national language to national unity and identity should not be compromised. At the regional level, is English relevant as a marker of an imagined regional identity? Using the language situations in Singapore and Indonesia, two key members of ASEAN, the following section will shed light on whether English can be framed as a means to an imagined ASEAN identity.

3.2 Language situations in Singapore and Indonesia as models for ASEAN

A closer examination of the Singaporean linguistic situation helps explain integration efforts at the ASEAN level. The use of English in Singapore as a link language that connects different language and ethnic groups together is a unique case among Southeast Asian polities. It can be seen as mirroring what ASEAN envisages for the region by using a ‘neutral’ language such as English for an imagined regional identity. Even though there are four official languages in Singapore, with Malay as the national language, it is English that is most commonly used for intra-national communication in an ethnically and culturally diverse city state. However, critics argue that it is ‘Singlish’, a local variety of English spoken in Singapore, rather than its more standardised form, which has become the marker of Singaporean identity (Alsagoff, 2010). At the ASEAN level, unless and until there is a Southeast Asian variety of English that can truly reflect the symbolic identity of ASEAN, it is much harder to replicate the national linguistic context of Singapore at a regional level. The emergence of a distinctly ASEAN variety of English is unlikely, in the near future. Although English is used as a lingua franca throughout the region, it is also characterised by inherent, chronic variability. Another issue is that ASEAN covers a much wider geographical and cultural scope, whereas Singapore exists at a significantly smaller scale, both in geographical and demographic terms. In a way, most Singaporeans share a common experience through English (Singlish), which gives them a sense of belonging and community. However, the same cannot be said of ASEAN. More than half of the member states of ASEAN, classified as belonging to the Expanding Circle, do not have a similar shared history with English. English therefore would not immediately be a language of unity in diversity for ASEAN, as in the case of Singapore. However, its prospect for the future may not be entirely ruled out. A regional way of using English might emerge (Hashim et al., 2016) which might unite the people and be part of a regional imagined identity.

The ‘imagined communities’ concept thrives on featuring a language as a tool for shaping identity, nationalism and community unification. Anderson (1983, 1998) used Bahasa Indonesia as an example of a language unifying the Indonesian people and giving them a sense of belonging and emotional attachment to a country, ‘Indonesia’. The question here is: Can English emulate this at a broader level to give ASEAN’s citizens a new form of ‘becoming’ and an imagined ‘identity’ of an imagined ASEAN community? The Indonesian national language planning context has some commonalities with ASEAN. Malay served as a lingua franca in major parts throughout the archipelago; the language has retained that role to the present day. However, the choice of Malay as the national language of Indonesia (Bahasa Indonesia) had not been normal or straightforward. Postcolonial Indonesia is extremely complex when languages and cultures are concerned, with more than 700 known living languages recorded (Eberhard et al., 2020). Speakers of Malay (now Indonesian) were far outnumbered by speakers of Javanese (Lowenberg, 1992). Malay was offered as a neutral alternative to the widely perceived threat of ethnic domination by the overwhelming Javanese-speaking majority (Lowenberg, 1992). It was estimated that only around 3% of the Indonesian population spoke the national language as their first language at the time of independence (Lowenberg, 1992). The promulgation of Bahasa Indonesia as a language for national unity in diversity and a significant identity marker has been heralded as one of the few successful language planning endeavours in the world (Fishman, 1971). This largely resembles ASEAN, which has chosen English as a neutral language in a linguistically and culturally diverse region. The fact that ASEAN values ‘unity in diversity’ should come as no surprise as ‘unity in diversity’ or in old Javanese – Bhinneka Tunggal Ika – is the motto of Indonesia (Heng, 2015). Similar to Indonesia, ASEAN’s leaders have imagined a regional community and identity, grounded in ‘unity in diversity’ principles. This principle is incorporated into the ASEAN Charter, though its role in community building is not clearly articulated (Heng, 2015). In the context of ASEAN, although the English language has emerged as one of the few possible means towards regional identity formation as a way of forging unity in diversity, English remains predominantly a pragmatic, link language with instrumental value, and not an emotive common language that necessarily reflects the identity or ethnicity of the people. (Kumar & Siddique, 2008). Lo Bianco (2004) meanwhile contends that new identities emerge and disappear continuously, and that identity is increasingly difficult to be tied to locality or nationality, and hence new models of imbricated identity are therefore needed. However, with strong national identity still prevalent in almost all Southeast Asian polities, identity regionalism remains a distant dream.

To construct an imagined regional identity, ASEAN member-states need to look beyond the nation-state lens and may have to ‘add’ another imagined layer of linguistic identity for regional solidarity and greater integration. One interesting parallel to be considered is, for example, the use of Bahasa Indonesia as a national lingua franca (nation-state lens) and accepting English as an international lingua franca (imagined regional identity). Nevertheless, since such an identity-building exercise is difficult to achieve even at a national level, it is uncertain how this can be achieved at the vastly multicultural ASEAN level (Acharya & Layug, 2013).

04

SYMBOLIC INDEXICALITIES OF IDENTITY 

IN ASEAN DOCUMENTS

To fully understand the concept of imagined communities and identity regionalism of ASEAN, tangible constructs for common identity need to be established. This section analyses themes related to ‘identity’, ‘symbol’ and ‘language’ in the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN Socio-cultural Community document and the ASEAN Workplan in Education 2011-2015.

Among the goals listed by the ASEAN Charter, ASEAN identity is notable. The relevant goal seeks: ‘To promote an ASEAN identity through the fostering of greater awareness of the diverse culture and heritage of the region’ (ASEAN Charter, 2008). Article 35 (p. 29) of the ASEAN Charter outlines ASEAN Identity by observing that ‘ASEAN shall promote its common identity and a sense of belonging among its people in order to achieve its shared destiny, goals and values.’ However, it is rather ambiguous as to how ASEAN aspires to achieve these lofty aims of promoting ‘common identity and a sense of belonging’ (see Heng, 2015). Other symbolic identifications, as enshrined in the ASEAN Charter, include the ASEAN Emblem and the ASEAN anthem – ‘The ASEAN Way’ and the ASEAN Flag. However, language is conspicuously left out of the section on ‘Identity and Symbols’. Article 34 of the ASEAN Charter specifies that ‘English shall be the working language of ASEAN’. This one-liner policy statement leaves much to be desired. The role of English for ASEAN is not elaborated; the role of other ASEAN languages also lacks adequate explanation in Article 34. This contradicts the vignette cited above which articulated the aspirations of the former Secretary-General of ASEAN (2013). Referring to the ASCC (2015-2025, p. 117), the clause on ASEAN identity stipulates: ‘Project ASEAN’s visibility through comprehensive, multi-stakeholder branding efforts, which are represented by common ASEAN identifiers–ASEAN Day, ASEAN Flag, ASEAN anthem and ASEAN emblem.’ Again, there is no mention of language being framed as part of an imagined identity regionalism. Under the pillar of ASEAN’s socio-cultural community, there are clauses, which concern aspects of language and education, as well as respect for linguistic and cultural diversity. But how these will be implemented is uncertain (Kirkpatrick, 2010). For ASEAN, imagined regionalism, as it seems, precludes the language aspect as one of the symbolic identity markers.

A closer analysis of the ASEAN Workplan in Education 2011-2015 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2012) reveals some of the initiatives planned. The ‘Language aspects’ in ASEAN Five-Year Work Plan on Education (2011-2015) are listed as follows:

1. Translate ASEAN charter into ASEAN national languages.

2. Offer ASEAN languages as optional foreign languages subjects in school.

3. Establish a sub-network on teacher capacity building by subject areas, including languages, among institution and universities.

4. Support language training programs.

5. Support learning of ASEAN languages and promote exchanges of linguists.

6. Support the citizens of Member States to become proficient in the English language, so that the citizens of the ASEAN region are able to communicate directly with one another and participate in the broader intercontinental community.

Language was mentioned six times in the ASEAN Five-Year Work Plan on Education (2011-2015). Even though Initiative (1) has been implemented, Initiatives (2) and (5) have not been fully realised (Hardini & Grangé, 2017). The choice of English as the official language has facilitated English language planning (in the respective countries) and in many cases led to less emphasis on ASEAN languages in schools. Initiatives (3) and (4) are conducted mostly bilaterally or in partnership with SEAMEO (Southeast Asian Ministry of Education Organisation) and ASEAN University Network (AUN). In most cases, it is Initiative (6) which has received considerable attention. Nevertheless, one may conclude that the member-states have not taken these recommendations seriously, as language and education are prerogatives of the member-states.

The ASEAN Charter is another document which contains references to language. Despite the principle enshrined in Article 2 of the ASEAN Charter (‘to respect the different cultures and languages of the region’), there is little evidence that ASEAN countries are teaching each other’s languages. With the exception of Putonghua (Mandarin), which is becoming increasingly popular and taught in more and more schools, no Asian languages (other than the first language) are taught as part of the core curriculum (Kirkpatrick, 2010). These recommendations have often been overshadowed by economic imperatives and rising ‘English fever’ in ASEAN (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2019). If language provisions in these documents mean anything, they symbolise merely a political rhetoric both in terms of ASEAN’s commitment to languages as well as the role of English as part of regional identity construction. The ASEAN Charter is at most aspirational and, even then, how to interpret or pursue some of its aspirations is debatable (Narine, 2009).

05

A WAY FORWARD: ENVISIONING AN 

ASEAN VARIETY OF ENGLISH

If English were to be part of ASEAN’s imagined regional identity, a key question to ask is:Which English should be used?Deterding and Kirkpatrick (2006) observed that people in ASEAN countries travel more and more to each other’s countries and engage in ever more widespread trade and tourism. It seems likely that a variety of English well-suited to the needs of its users will emerge and be established. Inspired by the Vienna-Oxford International Corpus of English (VOICE) project, the first corpus capturing spoken ELF interactions in Europe, the Asian Corpus of English (ACE), a onemillion-word corpus, was created to capture naturally occurring spoken ELF interactions in Asia (Kirkpatrick, 2016). For those interested, ACE is easily accessible online. Hashim et al. (2016) examined informal interactions between ASEAN speakers on the Asian Corpus of English. They analysed those features, such as the use of the particle ‘la(h)’, that may create rapport and illustrate that English as a lingua franca (ELF) has an ‘affective’ value and does not merely play a functional and transactional role in ASEAN (Hashim et al., 2016). Increasingly, native speaker and nativised models have become internationally less applicable in a world characterised by migration, racial mixing and diversity (Low & Ran, 2018). Ideally, the birth of a distinct hybridised variety of ASEAN English could one day facilitate a bottomup linguistic identity imagination of ASEAN, leading to an appropriation of English and identity that happens organically as an instance of ‘postcolonial performativity’ (Pennycook, 2000). Pennycook may be right in concentrating on localised ‘Englishes’; however, the point has been lost among administrators, politicians and educators. Such an idea appears utopian at this juncture, as the only likely candidate, English as the lingua franca, still requires a comprehensive ‘rebranding’ exercise through standardisation and quality control, corpus planning and acquisition planning in order to be ‘the language of ASEAN’s people’ (Low & Ran, 2018). Moreover, if we subscribe to Anna Mauranen’s (2012) idea of Englishes in the Expanding Circle being ‘similects’, rather than codifiable varieties, perhaps a distinct ASEAN variety of English may not emerge. The next section details possibilities to ‘harmonise’ ASEAN’s English language policies as well as the anticipated challenges.

5.1 Harmonising ASEAN’s English Language Policies

ASEAN does not have a language council, or a technical working committee on languages. The absence of such an entity results in a lacuna in language planning at the regional ASEAN level. This leads to compartmentalised policy implementation at national levels and a lack of intellectual discourse on achieving imagined regional integration, particularly regarding ASEAN’s socio-cultural, community integration. Thus, having a so-called ‘harmonised’ or ‘regional language plan’ by ASEAN is a remote possibility. If a regional roadmap for English language education in ASEAN were to be formulated, it could attempt to streamline ASEAN’s English language policies to cater for the divergent needs of the Outer Circle and Expanding Circle of English language users, as well as safeguard local interests in national, official and minority languages. If the initiative is not led by ASEAN, then member-states should come together to pursue this goal. At the moment, that again seems remote, since language is supposedly not one of the main agendas of ASEAN, unlike the European Union or the United Nations, which devote significant time, material and human resources to language planning. What complicates the linguistic situation is that, despite the existence of established varieties of English in several of the ASEAN’s member-states, the preferred model and the goal of language learning remains either a standardised British or standardised American model, as these are the models most closely associated with modernisation(Kirkpatrick, 2012).

Dudzik and Nguyen (2015, pp. 61, 62) have called for ASEAN-wide proficiency benchmarks and ELT competency frameworks to be developed, which would include creating a ‘common regional proficiency assessment framework’ and ‘regional English teacher competency assessment tools’ (p. 62). They also call for, among other practices:

the development of relevant curricula (such as Southeast Asian cultures) and for English to be taught no longer by teaching and assessing only native speaker varieties of English but also by introducing those spoken in neighbouring countries and by other regional multilingual speakers such as Singaporeans and Malaysians. (Dudzik & Nguyen, 2015,p. 60)

If ASEAN wishes to ‘synchronise’ English as a second language, this must be coordinated and implemented effectively, which to a large degree, is already being worked on in most ASEAN nations independently (Jones, 2004). In recent years, there has been an ongoing effort at synchronising English language curriculum, pedagogy and assessment in Thailand (Savski, 2020), Malaysia (Ahmad Afip et al., 2020), and Vietnam (Nguyen & Hamid, 2021) through the Common European Framework of Reference for Languages (CEFR), but other member-states have not joined these countries in this endeavour. The CEFR-aligned curriculum, pedagogy and assessment are first steps towards achieving measurable international standards for educators and learners from pre-school to tertiary levels (Savski, 2020). The framework has also seen some adaptation, particularly in Asia, with localised versions having been developed for ELT purposes in Japan (Negishi, 2012) and China (Jin et al., 2017). The issue then will be whether CEFR or another kind of framework, possibly ‘Common ASEAN Framework of Reference’ (CAFR), should be considered for the ‘harmonisation’ of an ASEAN version of English. One other issue is to determine the technicalities of ASEAN’s English from within the Asian Corpus of English (Kirkpatrick, 2016) as the benchmark for the region. 

Although regional ASEAN language governance is still years in the making, an ambitious plan involving harmonisation of the higher education system was set up in 2009, aimed at creating a systematic mechanism to support the integration of universities across Southeast Asia (Sirat et al., 2014). Education, particularly harmonisation of the higher education system through ASEAN Higher Education Area (AHEA), has been treated as the core regional integration initiative within the ASEAN-Sociocultural Community (Sirat et al., 2014). In the spirit of systemic ‘harmonisation’, the ASEAN community may do well to emulate the creation of AHEA by focusing on a Common ASEAN Framework of Reference for English. In this context, the role of Southeast Asian Ministers of Education Organisation (SEAMEO) is critical in successfully ‘harmonising’ ASEAN’s English language education policies. This, in turn, may contribute towards ASCC’s integration efforts, thereby establishing an imagined ‘identity regionalism’.

5.2 Addressing English language disparities in ASEAN

The most recent statistics show a vast disparity in the percentage of English language speakers among the population in ASEAN member-states; this ranges from a high of 80% estimated English language speakers in Singapore, to 65% in the Philippines, 60% in Brunei, 50% in Malaysia, and 15% in Myanmar, while Expanding Circle countries including Vietnam have approximately 10% English language speakers, as does Thailand; among the Expanding Circle countries, there are only 5% estimated English language speakers in Cambodia, Indonesia and Laos respectively (Bolton & BaconShone, 2020). Narrowing English language proficiency gaps among language speakers proves to be a fundamental challenge for regional governments, as well as ASEAN, wishing to capitalise on the relationship between economic growth and the spread of English. Even after harmonising higher education systems in ASEAN countries, the language barrier may remain a lingering problem in the member countries. Thus, recommendations to not only increase the usage of English language, but also further developing English language proficiency within the ASEAN region, are among the focal areas being considered (Sirat et al., 2014). These initiatives will hopefully help address the entrenched intraASEAN English language disparities, enable each individual in ASEAN to communicate actively, and collectively realise the dream to build an ASEAN identity.

English, in many cases, also disadvantages certain groups in most countries, especially those in rural areas, as well as those deprived of access to English language teachers, curriculum resources and basic educational needs (Tupas, 2018). There are also widespread perceptions of English being a language that privileges the elites and urban settlements, as well as those in countries in the Outer Circle (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2019). These issues need to be rectified to provide English language education equitably (Tsui & Tollefson, 2007). In a bid to enhance English language proficiency levels among ASEAN citizens via a more coordinated approach to LPP, a contextually-relevant approach is key. As Kirkpatrick and Liddicoat (2020, p. 20) suggest:

a group of experts drawn from the region could be established whose role would be to critically review current language-in-education policies and to work together to come up with contextually sensitive and relevant principles of language education which would inform all future language-in-education policies, including, of course, policies relating to choice of languages, to programmes, to personnel, and to pedagogy.

Such principles are key to reforms towards a more holistic linguistic approach among ASEAN member-states.

06

(RE-)IMAGINING LANGUAGE IDENTITY REGIONALISM

Since ASEAN consists of member-governments, ‘regionalism’ is thus expressed as an ‘artificial, top-down process’ (Hoshiro, 2019). The role that ASEAN leaders play in ‘imagining’ identity regionalism and how they shape ASEAN’s development, however, still remains unclear (Narine, 2009). The main ‘sticking point’ is that ASEAN is still generally regarded as an ‘elitist’ organisation that is far from its people (Baba, 2016). At present, the quest for a regional identity is an elite political project, and without an accommodating, inclusive and pluralistic society, a common regional identity will be hard – if not impossible – to establish (Jönsson, 2010). If ASEAN is serious about building an ASEAN sociocultural community, it needs to be inclusive, rather than being exclusive when it comes to ‘imagining’ language as part of identity regionalism. Until now, ASEAN has done little to pool resources to encourage the citizenry and the civil society to engage with ASEAN discourses and narratives (Heng, 2015; Narine, 2009).

The narratives on identity at ASEAN’s round-table discussion held in November 2020 was a welcome initiative which generated renewed awareness of the topic. The narrative was the main deliverable of the 2020 Year of ASEAN Identity under Vietnam’s Chairmanship, and adopted by the ASEAN Leaders at the 37th ASEAN Summit in November 2020 (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). ASEAN leaders were mindful of the ‘urgent necessity to find common ground between national and regional interests’ and that ‘ASEAN Identity shall strengthen the ASEAN Community’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020, p. 1). At the ASEAN Summit, an imagined ASEAN Community was defined as ‘the ultimate goal of ASEAN Community building process; a community that is bound by the values that drive the people of ASEAN to achieve advanced citizenship and enlightenment; a community that has a regional perspective, which manages to have a balance between national and regional interests’ (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020, p. 4). The ASEAN narrative was expected to be used by all member nations to popularise ASEAN among the common people; this narrative emphasised that ASEAN is not only an organisation that is built on political interests but that there are also cultural values in Southeast Asia that must be incorporated into the ASEAN identity (ASEAN Secretariat, 2020). Precedents of ‘print capitalism’ inform us that common language development and dissemination can potentially be an integral tool in promoting (ASEAN’s) regional identity, but such development also always occurs in contexts in which those to whom these initiatives/narratives are directed are also those with varied capacities to engage with this mode of communication (English language). Nevertheless, hopefully, the Narratives of ASEAN Identity 2020 is a genesis for similar discourses, to strengthen the ASCC pillar. Overall, the intentions and the mood at the summit were laudable. However, it is yet to be seen whether the ASEAN One Community and One Identity aspirations will be fully embraced with rejuvenated efforts by the top echelons of ASEAN or whether they remain very much political rhetoric, as some sceptics have lamented over the years (Jönsson, 2010; Narine, 1999, 2009).

In hindsight, as an ASEAN Community, although the sense of belonging needs to be nurtured, it does not necessarily have to be through English, which has no significant cultural and ethnic imprint in the region. Having said that, English may also facilitate some form of cultural identity. For instance, there are many ASEAN authors writing in English about their own cultural backgrounds and identity; works of this nature could be adopted in the attempt to build a regional identity.

In relation to the launching of the ASEAN Economic Community, Hardini and Grangé (2017) noted that English as a lingua franca may only cover the needs of political and administration staff, but it does not guarantee understanding and friendship between the peoples that constitute ASEAN. This makes one wonder how and why English is used as a ‘bridge’ to shape the ASEAN identity when more than half of the ASEAN member states have minimal association with the language. Future research could draw upon discourses of national leaders, politicians and policymakers within the power structure of ASEAN to provide richer insights into their perspectives on English in ASEAN and the idea of language contributing to an imagined identity regionalism. Should there be another language to represent ASEAN, preferably a local language, familiar to close to 50% of the ASEAN population like Bahasa Indonesia/Malay? Hardini and Grangé (2017) proposed the promotion of regional Southeast Asian languages, a condition they believe is necessary for understanding between peoples and for the political and economic success of the ASEAN community. For that to happen, there should be intensive efforts at regional or national levels to develop proficiency in neighbouring languages. Although the understanding of linguistic richness is often part of the discourses of ‘belonging’ and ‘ASEAN awareness’, there are few professed commitments to the learning and teaching of ASEAN languages and cultures (Kirkpatrick & Liddicoat, 2020). Since the political impetus for promoting the teaching and learning of specific languages in this region is almost entirely instrumental, as mentioned in previous sections, it is hardly surprising that almost all national governments in Southeast Asia have introduced English language education policies at the primary and secondary schools, rather than in relation to neighbouring languages. From a different perspective, the linguistic diversity and plurilingualism of the region may also be regarded as part of an ASEAN identity.

07

CONCLUSION

The ASEAN tagline of ‘One Vision, One Identity, One Community’ indicates the desire of the ASEAN member-states to be recognised as an influential bloc with a unified identity. Based on current observations, the universal adoption of English as a communicative and economic tool and its spread within ASEAN is noteworthy. However, its unifying utility for ASEAN as an imagined regional community and identity has yet to materialise. In this paper, we have argued that the Southeast Asian community generally perceives national languages or ethnic languages as symbolic identity marker(s). ASEAN’s motto that is premised on English being the link language that can gel the region and its people together is still political rhetoric and sounds, arguably, incredulously utopian. The reality is that English remains the most widely learnt and used additional language in the region, but with no affinity or identity attachment. The spread of English in Southeast Asia is projected to continue, but its function is purely instrumental. At best, English perhaps can be packaged as a marker of ASEAN’s ‘functional identity’, instead of a more substantive ASEAN’s ‘socio-cultural identity’. Arguably, what constitutes ASEAN identity and ASEAN community should be made clearer and shared with its citizens, so that a greater sense of belonging and an added layer of regional identity can be crystallised. Although some may claim there are other ways to promote integration and identity of ASEAN, it is too soon to rule out language, and in this context, how English might have such potential in the future. One advantage of using English is that it may help the member-states within ASEAN get along better, and if that happens, their common people may get along better, and thus help strengthen the socio-cultural pillar. In that sense, English may be able to achieve something significant. Hypothetically, to realise the full potential of English as presented in the opening vignette, there is a need to move beyond the lens of national languages and start to ‘imagine’ the English language as part of ASEAN’s ‘identity regionalism’. However, how this unfolds, including in relation to the myriad of ‘Englishes’ that might help stimulate such reform and prospects regionally, is a moot point, and an area for continued future research. Although language can potentially play an important role in building an ‘imagined identity regionalism’, it is not necessarily a vital goal for ASEAN to foster a common identity via English. As we have argued, the emergence of an ASEAN English variety remains an idealistic dream.

文章来源

To cite this article:

Lee, H. Y., Hamid, M. O., & Hardy, I. (2021). English and regional identity in ASEAN.

World Englishes, 1-15. https://doi.org/10.1111/weng.12571

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